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he major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and statutory
and rule amendments.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez,' the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the jurisdiction of a county court at law over a claim for
violation of the Texas statute that prohibits an employer from discharging
an employee in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. 2 The
Court concluded that the provision of the statute authorizing a district
court to restrain violations thereof3 did not give district courts exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases generally or requests for injunction specifi-
cally.4 Thus, the Court looked to the Legislature's general grant of juris-
dictional authority to the Harris County civil court at law and found it to
be co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the district courts in cases in
which the amount in controversy does not exceed $100,000.5 Because the
plaintiff originally pleaded an amount within this jurisdictional limit, her
subsequent amendment seeking more than $100,000 in damages (and the
trial court's award in excess of that amount) did not strip the trial court of
jurisdiction where the defendant failed to prove that the original amount
in controversy was fraudulently alleged.6
* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Partner, Figari & Dav-
enport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996).
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8307c (repealed) (codified without substantive
changes at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996)).
3. See TEX. L A. CODE ANN. § 451.003.
4. See Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 447.
5. See id. at 447-48 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 25.0003(c) and 25.1032(a) &
(c) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1998)).
6. See Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 449. While the court expressed concern over the pro-
priety of a court of limited jurisdiction rendering a judgment far in excess of its maximum
jurisdictional limits, as well as the difficulties generally of "the patchwork organization of
Texas' several trial courts," it concluded that it could not say on the record before it that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 449-50.
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The Texas Supreme Court curtailed the district courts' power to grant
certain types of injunctive relief in Ex parte Evans.7 The Court held in
this habeas corpus proceeding that, while the district courts have author-
ity, with certain exceptions, to enjoin litigation in other state courts in
Texas or elsewhere, they are "completely without power to restrain fed-
eral court proceedings in in personam actions."'8 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the contempt judgment against relator for violating an
injunction by filing a federal court lawsuit was void.9
By statute, a party may sue for an injunction to stay execution of a
judgment,10 but any such suit must be tried in the court in which the judg-
ment was rendered." This latter requirement is jurisdictional and does
not merely relate to venue.' 2 In Butron v. Cantu,13 the court held that
this requirement extends to an injunction that prohibits collection on a
supersedeas bond.14 The court reasoned that, because a supersedeas
bond suspends execution of the judgment and permits a judgment credi-
tor to look only to the bond for satisfaction, enjoining recovery on the
bond is the same as enjoining execution on the judgment.' 5 Thus, such an
injunction can be sought only from the court that rendered the judgment,
and any other court lacks jurisdiction. 16
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Bloom v. Bloom17 involved an appeal by writ of error from a default
decree of divorce. The appellant complained that the trial court had
never acquired personal jurisdiction over her because she was not prop-
erly served with process.' 8 The court of appeals did not reach the merits
of the appellant's complaints regarding service, however, because it con-
cluded that she was estopped under the "acceptance-of-benefits doc-
trine." 9 As the court explained it, the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine
prevents a party that voluntarily accepts the benefits of a judgment from
thereafter prosecuting an appeal from that judgment.20 Although no
court had previously held the doctrine applicable in a writ of error pro-
ceeding grounded on defective service, the court could discern no reason
why it should not apply where appellant had knowledge of the judgment
at the time she accepted benefits thereunder. 2'
7. 939 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1997).
8. Id. at 143 (quoting Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964)).
9. See Evans, 939 S.W.2d at 144.
10. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.013 (Vernon 1997).
11. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023(b) (Vernon 1997).
12. See Switzer v. Smith, 300 S.W. 31, 32 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgm't adopted).
13. 960 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1997, n.w.h.).
14. See id. at 95.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. 935 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
18. See id. at 945.
19. See id.
20. See id. (citing Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950)).
21. See Bloom, 935 S.W.2d at 946-47.
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Trial practitioners routinely forego filing motions to quash based on
defective service, reasoning that it can gain them nothing more than addi-
tional time to answer.22 Moody National Bank v. Riebschlager23 teaches,
however, that a motion to quash may be dispositive in a garnishment ac-
tion. The garnishees in that case answered and moved to quash the ser-
vice of the writ of garnishment. 24 The court granted the motion to quash,
but the garnishor never effected proper service thereafter.25 The garnish-
ees then successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the writ was never properly served and, therefore, they were not liable as
a matter of law. 26 In affirming summary judgment, the court of appeals
noted that garnishment is a harsh remedy that requires strict compliance
with the statutory requirements and related procedural rules.27 Thus,
notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 121,28 the court held that the gar-
nishees' filing of an answer did not constitute an appearance and gave the
court no jurisdiction over the funds in their possession.29 Likewise, the
court held that Rule 122,30 which affords a defendant additional time to
answer if service is quashed, 31 is wholly inapplicable to garnishment pro-
ceedings and the garnishees were not deemed to have made a general
appearance by filing their motion to quash.32
The court in Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. v. Wallace33 disagreed with
one of its sister courts of appeals on what constitutes strict compliance
with the rules regarding service by mail. The district court clerk served
the citation and petition in that case by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested. 34 When the return receipt came back to the clerk's office, it was
time and date stamped, file-marked, initialed, and attached to the cita-
tion.35 The clerk did not, however, fill out the return of service section of
the citation itself.36 The court of appeals reversed the ensuing default
judgment, holding that, in attaching the postal return receipt rather than
completing the return of service, the district clerk failed to strictly comply
with the applicable procedural rules.37 The court noted that Walker v.
22. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 122 (extending appearance date to ten o'clock a.m. on the
Monday next after the expiration of twenty days after the day on which citation or service
is quashed).
23. 946 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).




28. TEX. R. Civ. P. 121 ("An answer shall constitute an appearance of the defendant
so as to dispense with the necessity for the issuance or service of citation upon him.").
29. See Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d at 523-24.
30. TEX. R. Civ. P. 122.
31. See id.
32. See Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d at 524.
33. 944 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied).
34. See id. at 73.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 74.
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W.J. T., Inc.38 had found a similar use of a postal receipt in lieu of a return
of service sufficient under the rules, but concluded that sound public pol-
icy favored a more rigorous enforcement of the strict compliance stan-
dard since it increases the opportunity for a party to be heard on the
merits.39
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Beginning with National Industrial Sand Association v. Gibson,40 the
Texas Supreme Court has allowed mandamus review of a trial court's de-
nial of a special appearance in cases in which there was such a "total and
inarguable absence of jurisdiction" that normal appellate review from a
final judgment was inadequate. 41 Even some members of the Court rec-
ognized, however, that this standard provided little guidance for the
bench and bar.42 The Legislature eliminated this uncertainty during the
Survey period with the enactment of section 51.014(a)(7) of the Texas
Civil Practices and Remedies Code, 43 which now permits an interlocutory
appeal from the denial of a special appearance. 44 The availability of this
new right of interlocutory appeal will, of course, eliminate any need for
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.45
IV. VENUE
Under former Texas practice, venue was fixed in the county named in a
plea of privilege 46 whenever a plaintiff nonsuited his action before the
trial court made its venue determination. 47 Although the Texas Supreme
Court in Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.4 8 refused to decide whether this "venue-
38. 737 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
39. See Wallace, 944 S.W.2d at 75.
40. 879 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995).
41. Id. at 776 (quoting Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Tex.
1994)).
42. See CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 597-601 (Tex. 1996) (Gonzalez, J., concur-
ring and Baker, J., dissenting) (discussed in A. Erin Dwyer, et al., Texas Civil Procedure, 50
SMU L. REV. 1513, 1516-17 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Annual Survey]).
43. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
44. See id.
45. See Raymond Overseas Holding, Ltd. v. Curry, 955 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding) (holding mandamus was not appropriate remedy for
denial of special appearance in light of interlocutory appeal right and refusing to treat
mandamus petition as an interlocutory appeal).
46. Prior to their amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging
a plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
Complementing the Legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statute, Act of June 17,
1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch 385 § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119-24 (now codified at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001, et seq. (Vernon 1986)), the Texas Supreme
Court promulgated amended procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all references to the
plea of privilege. See Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted in 46 TEX. B.J. 858, 858-59 (1983)
(special tear-out section).
47. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958, 967
(1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
48. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
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fixing" rule survived the 1983 venue amendments, the court of appeals in
Geochem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes49 subsequently held that the rule still
applies. Even so, the court in Zimmerman v. Ottis5° concluded that this
rule does not authorize a trial court to grant a motion to transfer venue
after the plaintiff has filed his motion for nonsuit. Instead, the trial
court's power in those circumstances is limited to performing the ministe-
rial duty of entering an order of dismissal.51 According to Zimmerman,
the remedy applied in Geochem lies with the court in which the plaintiff
refiles his action, not the court of original filing.5 2 The appellate court
could find no reason for allowing the court in which the action was first
filed to ignore the nonsuit, anticipate a refiling of the same lawsuit else-
where, and shortcut the process by transferring the nonsuited action to
the county requested by the defendant.53
The plaintiff in Acker v. Denton Publishing Co. 54 filed a suit in Tarrant
County against numerous defendants alleging libel and slander. Section
15.017 of the venue statute, 55 which is a "mandatory" venue provision,56
provides that a suit for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy must be
brought either in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time the
cause of action accrued or the county in which any of the defendants
resided at the time of suit. Although the plaintiff and all but one of the
defendants in Acker resided in Denton County, the plaintiff predicated
his venue choice on the undisputed fact that the remaining defendant re-
sided in Tarrant County. That defendant, however, submitted an affidavit
in support of a motion to transfer venue by all defendants in which he
stated that he had not personally performed, assisted, or supervised the
alleged libel and had no relation to the matters alleged by Plaintiff other
than his service as an officer of the corporate defendant. Based on this
affidavit, the trial court granted the defendant's motion and transferred
the suit to Denton County.
On appeal from a summary judgment subsequently rendered in favor
of defendants, the plaintiff asserted that the original trial court erred
when it sustained the motion to transfer venue because plaintiff's petition
expressly named the Tarrant County resident as one of the defendants.
The court of appeals disagreed, concluding after a full review of the rec-
ord that it did not "substantiate any claim by [plaintiff] against [the Tar-
rant County defendant] for acts done by him in his individual capacity."'57
According to the court, its full review of the record following judgment
49. 929 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ) (discussed in 1997 Annual
Survey, supra note 42, at 1521-22).
50. 941 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
51. See id. at 261.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 261-62.
54. 937 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
55. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.017 (Vernon 1986).
56. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1998);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(2)(a).
57. Acker, 937 S.W.2d at 116.
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was not only authorized by Ruiz,58 but also appropriate to provide a de-
fendant with just recourse from improper venue that a plaintiff could
otherwise wrongfully gain by fake or "inaccurate pleadings that the trial
court had to accept at face value in the venue process. ' 59 Although Rule
87 expressly provides that proof a cause of action exists is no longer re-
quired to establish venue, 60 the Acker court's statements suggest that ap-
pellate review of a venue determination goes beyond the so-called
"venue facts" that may be in controversy and even extends to the issue of
whether plaintiff has substantiated a claim against a named defendant.
Although it is not clear that the supreme court has yet reached the same
conclusion in any of its decisions, the Acker statements are probably dicta
and thus do not present the supreme court with an opportunity to address
this issue.61
V. PARTIES
Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals62 addresses a
novel question: Does the Texas Supreme Court's mandamus jurisdiction
extend to interlocutory class certification rulings of the court of appeals?
The trial court in Deloitte denied class certification in the underlying law-
suit. On an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(3) of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code,63 the court of appeals ordered a class certi-
fied.64 Although the parties opposing class certification then applied for
writ of error in the Supreme Court, it dismissed the application for want
of jurisdiction because an appeal of an interlocutory class certification is
final in the court of appeals in the absence of a dissent or conflict. 65 The
imaginative defendant then filed an original mandamus proceeding con-
tending that the court of appeals had abused its discretion by misapplying
the procedural rule governing class actions.66
Although the Court granted leave to consider the question, it ulti-
mately concluded that it should not exercise its writ power under the cir-
cumstances of the case. 67 In doing so, however, the Court expressly
58. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. 1993).
59. Acker, 937 S.W.2d at 116 (citing Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept., 886
S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1994)).
60. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
61. In this connection, the court observed that plaintiff's petition did not even allege
that the Tarrant County defendant had personally committed any of the wrongs. See
Acker, 937 S.W.2d at 116-17. Further, the defendant's affidavit proving his lack of involve-
ment was uncontroverted by the plaintiff. See id. at 117. Therefore, it appears plaintiff had
failed to plead a proper cause of action against that defendant, and it is unclear why the
appellate court even needed to engage in a review of the full record.
62. 951 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1997).
63. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3) (Vernon Supp. 1998) provides
that a person may appeal from an interlocutory trial court order certifying or refusing to
certify a class in a suit brought under TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
64. See Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 655 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
65. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b), (c) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1998).
66. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
67. See Deloitte, 951 S.W.2d at 395.
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rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Legislature had foreclosed the
possibility of mandamus jurisdiction by granting exclusive final authority
over interlocutory class certification decisions to the courts of appeals. 68
Although the Court acknowledged that review of such interlocutory or-
ders fell outside its appellate jurisdiction,69 it determined that original
jurisdiction for mandamus is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction 70 and
that the Legislature had not excluded class certification rulings from the
court's mandamus jurisdiction. 71 Nonetheless, the Court observed that
mandamus is appropriate only if a party establishes lack of an adequate
appellate remedy and, even then, only in extraordinary circumstances. 72
The Court concluded that Deloitte's appellate remedy was adequate both
because of the statutorily granted interlocutory appeal of the class certifi-
cation ruling and because Deloitte could appeal the class certification
again after a trial on the merits.73 Moreover, the Court held that there is
no "right" to a second appeal and, therefore, the "finality" of Deloitte's
appellate remedy at the court of appeals level could not alone serve as a
basis for the court's exercise of its mandamus power.74 The Court simi-
larly rejected Deloitte's contention that the court of appeals' action in
directing class certification by itself constituted an extraordinary circum-
stance giving rise to a mandamus remedy. 75 Although the Court ac-
knowledged that no Texas appellate court had ever directed certification
of a class, it pointed out that numerous appellate courts from other juris-
dictions had done so, including the Fifth Circuit.76
Although Deloitte's petition for writ of mandamus was denied, the
Court's opinion leaves open the possibility of mandamus being issued
against a court of appeals in this context for procedural irregularities or
for actions taken by a court of appeals that are "so devoid of any basis in
law as to be beyond its power."'77 Justice Spector dissented, criticizing
this part of the majority's analysis for "fail[ing] to reconcile the inherent
conflict" between the court's assumption of mandamus jurisdiction in
such cases and section 22.225(b), which makes the courts of appeals' deci-
sions on class certification orders conclusive on the law and facts. 78 Ar-
guing that "the court should just say no to mandamus review in these
68. See id. at 396.
69. Indeed, the court had earlier dismissed Deloitte's application for writ of error for
lack of jurisdiction due to the legislative proscription of TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.225(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
70. See Deloitte, 951 S.W.2d at 396.
71. See id. (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (Vernon 1988) ("The supreme
court ... may issue writs of ... mandamus agreeable to the principles of law regulating
those writs, against ... a court of appeals .....
72. See Deloitte, 951 S.W.2d at 396-97.
73. See id. at 397.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. (citing, inter alia, Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1993)).
77. Deloitte, 951 S.W.2d at 398.




circumstances, ' 79 the dissent warned that the majority's refusal to draw a
bright jurisdictional line in the case would cause losing parties to file
mandamus petitions in virtually every class certification appeal.80
VI. PLEADINGS
Normally a party may amend or supplement its pleadings at any time
up to seven days before trial. 81 Within seven days of the date of trial,
however, a party may not amend or supplement without leave of court.82
In Waite Hill Services, Inc. v. World Class Metal Works, Inc.,83 defendants
sought leave to amend their answers to raise an affirmative defense that
the loss sued upon was expressly excluded from coverage under the insur-
ance policy at issue. 84 The trial court denied leave because defendants
waited until after opening statements to the jury before they presented
supplemental answers that raised this defense for the first time. On ap-
peal, defendants contended that leave was required because plaintiff did
not meet its threshold burden of demonstrating surprise or prejudice. 85
The court of appeals pointed out two Texas Supreme Court decisions,86
however, reinforcing the general principle that a trial court has no discre-
tion to refuse the proffered amendment unless "(1) the opposing party
presents evidence of surprise or prejudice; or (2) the amendment ... as-
serts a new defense, and is thus prejudicial on its face."' 87 According to
the court, the trial court was entitled to conclude that each supplemental
pleading on its face was calculated to surprise and prejudice the plaintiff
by reshaping the grounds of the defense in a manner that was untimely
under Rules 63, 66 and 94.88
Even more germane to the court was the principle that a trial court
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow an amendment when the
record shows a lack of diligence by the party seeking to amend after the
seven-day barrier, and the belated pleading contains matters that are not
newly discovered but were readily available for earlier pleading had dili-
79. Deloitte, 951 S.W.2d at 399. Justice Spector gave due attribution of the quoted
language to one amicus curiae, Professor William Dorsaneo. See id.
80. See id. at 400.
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
82. Id.
83. 935 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996) rev'd, 959 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1998).
84. Under TEX. R. Civ. P. 94, a defendant in a suit on an insurance contract who does
not specifically allege in its written pleading that the loss was due to a risk specifically
excepted by the contract may not raise that defense at trial.
85. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 63, 66 (generally providing that leave of court for amendments
within seven days of trial or thereafter should be freely given absent showing of surprise or
prejudice to opposing party).
86. See State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1236 (1994); Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.
1990).
87. Waite Hill Servs., 935 S.W.2d at 199.
88. See id. at 200; TEX. R. Civ. P. 63, 66, 94.
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gence been used. 89 The record revealed that defendants' counsel had
knowledge of the exception's wording from the start of the dispute and
the exception was also a subject of pretrial discovery.90 To permit a late
amendment under these circumstances, said the court, would enable de-
fendants to flout Rule 9491 and transfer the adverse consequences of non-
compliance from themselves to the opposing party who prepared for trial
in good faith reliance on the pleadings that existed when trial began.92
VII. DISCOVERY
A. PROCEDURES AND SCOPE
The court in AIU Insurance Co. v. Mehaffy93 held that a trial court
lacked the power to appoint an "auditor" to investigate allegations of
discovery abuse. 94 The court examined the possible sources of authority
the trial court might have been relying upon (the lower court not having
specified), including Rules 171, 95 172,96 and 215,97 but found each insuffi-
cient to support the trial court's order.98
Most trial practitioners are now familiar with the protection against
"apex" depositions of high-ranking corporate officials.99 Simon v. Bride-
well1°° teaches, however, that the courts will not extend this protection
beyond what is required to serve its purpose. Specifically, the court held
in Simon that the proposed deponents, general partners in a limited part-
nership, were not exempt from depositions merely because they held
high-ranking positions with related corporations. 10 1 And although the
court did not preclude the possibility that the apex doctrine might be ex-
tended to general partners in a limited partnership, it concluded that such
an extension was not warranted under the facts of the case before it.102
Finally, the court also noted the general partners were named parties in
the suit and, therefore, could be deposed regardless of their status as cor-
porate officials. 10 3
Acevedo Trucking, Inc. v. State'°4 serves as a reminder that the tran-
89. See Waite Hill Servs., 935 S.W.2d at 199. See also Amsav Group, Inc. v. American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Brazoria County, 796 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
90. See Waite Hill Servs., 935 S.W.2d at 200.
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
92. See Waite Hill Servs., 935 S.W.2d at 200.
93. 942 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding).
94. See id. at 803.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171 (governing appointment of masters in chancery).
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 172 (governing appointment of auditors to examine accounts).
97. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215 (governing discovery sanctions).
98. See Mehaffy, 942 S.W.2d at 800-03.
99. See generally Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.
1995) (defining steps to be followed before apex deposition will be permitted).
100. 950 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, orig. proceeding).
101. See id. at 442.
102. See id. at 443.
103. See id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 200).
104. 934 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
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script of a deposition on written questions should be carefully reviewed
for potential responsiveness objections prior to trial. The court in that
case held that an objection that the deponent's answer was nonresponsive
was waived where it was raised for the first time at trial.10 5 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on Rule 207(3),106 which provides that
objections to the manner and form of taking a deposition must be made
in writing before trial if the deposition has been on file with the court for
at least one day prior to trial.10 7
B. PRIVILEGE AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court endorsed a strong consulting-expert privi-
lege in General Motors Corp. v. Gayle.10 8 The trial judge in the underly-
ing personal injury action had ordered General Motors to designate in
advance whether its crash tests would be used solely for consulting pur-
poses or would be introduced as evidence at trial, and that the plaintiff be
allowed to attend any tests designated as evidentiary. 10 9 The Court held
that this advance-designation requirement undermined the consulting-ex-
pert privilege set forth in Rule 166b(3)(b). 110 The Court reasoned that
the consulting-expert privilege was intended to create a "sphere of pro-
tection and privacy" in which parties can perform litigation testing and
otherwise prepare their cases free from the fear that they are producing
evidence for their opponents."' The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that it would be unfair to allow General Motors to run numerous
crash tests, varying the parameters, and then present only those that were
favorable to it.112 In this regard, the Court stated that the company could
not "rig" a test since the test would only be admissible at trial if the con-
ditions were substantially similar to those under which the accident oc-
curred.113 Moreover, the Court was unmoved by plaintiffs' argument that
they lacked the resources to conduct their own crash tests, noting that the
consulting-expert privilege protects the core of a party's litigation strat-
egy and is not subject to the substantial hardship exception applicable to
the witness-statement and party communications privilege.114
The consulting-expert privilege was also at issue in Castellanos v. Little-
john.115 There, the plaintiffs had mistakenly identified a doctor engaged
as a consulting expert as a testifying expert in interrogatory answers." 6
The defendant then claimed plaintiffs were required to execute a medical
105. See id. at 813.
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(3).
107. See id.; Acevedo Trucking, 934 S.W.2d at 813.
108. 951 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1997).
109. See id. at 470.
110. See Gayle, 951 S.W.2d at 474 (discussing TEX. R. CIv. P. 166b(3)(b)).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 475.
113. See id.
114. See id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)).
115. 945 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding).
116. See id. at 237.
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authorization under Rule 166b(2)(h) 117 so that it could obtain the con-
sultant doctor's records.118 The court held, however, that the consulting-
expert privilege limits Rule 166b(2)(h)" 9 and that the inadvertent disclo-
sure of the consultant's identity was correctable and could not serve as a
basis for compelling the disclosure of his medical records as well.' 20
With virtually no discussion, the court in D.N.S. v. Schattman121 held
that a defendant doctor's narrative report to his insurer was a privileged
party communication.12 2 The question of whether the report was never-
theless discoverable because the defendant was designated as a testifying
expert, however, proved somewhat thornier. Agreeing with one of its
sister courts of appeals, the court held that the mere designation of a
party as an expert witness does not automatically waive the party-com-
munication privilege if the party/expert does not rely on privileged mater-
ials as a basis for his testimony.'2 3 The court then went on to analyze
whether the report should be disclosed under either Rule
166b(2)(e)(1)12 4 or Rule 166b(2)(e)(2). 12 5 The court concluded that only
the latter rule, which by its terms governs tangible materials, was applica-
ble.12 6 The court then held that a narrative report prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation is distinct from a report prepared in anticipation of an
expert's testimony within the meaning of Rule 166b(2)(e)(2). 127 Because
the doctor did not prepare the pre-trial narrative report to his insurer in
anticipation of his testimony as an expert, the report was not properly
discoverable. 128
C. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT
The court in Campos v. State Farm General Insurance Co. 129 addressed
the interplay between Rule 215(5)'s130 automatic exclusion of expert wit-
nesses who have not been timely designated' 3 ' and the limitations on so-
called "death penalty" sanctions first announced in TransAmerican Natu-
ral Gas Corp. v. Powell.132 The court held that TransAmerican's require-
ment that any discovery sanction chosen by a trial court be just-i.e.,
117. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(h).
118. See Castellanos, 945 S.W.2d at 238.
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(h).
120. See Castellanos, 945 S.W.2d at 239-40.
121. 937 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding).
122. See id. at 157.
123. See id. at 156 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Blackmon, 810 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding)).
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(1).
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(2).
126. See D.N.S., 937 S.W.2d at 157.
127. See id. at 158.
128. See id. at 158-59.
129. 943 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
130. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
131. "A party who fails to respond to or supplement his response to a request for dis-
covery shall not be entitled to ... offer the testimony of an expert witness ... unless the
trial court finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists." Id.
132. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
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directly related to the offending conduct and not excessive' 33-did not
apply to the exclusion of expert witnesses under Rule 215(5)134 because
the rule is mandatory and does not provide the trial court with any discre-
tion in choosing a sanction.1 35 The court implicitly acknowledged, how-
ever, that TransAmerican's holding that due process limits the trial
court's power to impose sanctions that "preclude presentation of the mer-
its of the case"'136 is potentially applicable to the exclusion sanction.1 37
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the exclusion of an expert witness
on attorneys' fees in Campos did not constitute a death penalty sanction
under the TransAmerican rule. 138
The plaintiffs in Cruz v. Furniture Technicians of Houston, Inc.139 com-
plained of the exclusion of an expert witness they designated more than
thirty days before trial, but after the deadline established by the trial
court's docket control order. 140 The plaintiffs argued that their designa-
tion was timely under Rule 166b(6)(b)14 and that they had provided the
expert's written report at a mediation well in advance of the court-im-
posed deadline. 142 This argument backfired, however, when the appellate
court indicated that this earlier disclosure of the expert's identity evi-
denced that plaintiffs had not designated him "as soon as practicable" as
required by Rule 166b(6)(b). 143
The court in Morua v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.a44 revisited the
issue of whether supplemental interrogatory answers must be verified.
The court adhered to its prior holding in Ramirez v. Ramirez145 that ver-
ification is required.' 46 In doing so, however, the court noted the split
among the intermediate appellate courts on the question. 147 Obviously,
this issue is ripe for review by the Texas Supreme Court.
D. SANcriONS
A $10 million discovery sanction was struck down by the court in Ford
Motor Co. v. Tyson.148 As a sanction for various alleged abuses of the
discovery process, the trial judge in that case had entered an order ex-
133. See id. at 917.
134. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
135. See Campos, 943 S.W.2d at 54-55; see also Webb v. Ray, 944 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (TransAmerican inapplicable to trial court's
denial of motion to withdraw deemed admissions and motion for new trial).
136. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 918.
137. See Campos, 943 S.W.2d at 55.
138. See id.
139. 949 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
140. See id. at 35.
141. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(b) (requiring supplementation to identify expert witnesses
as soon as practicable and at least thirty days before trial).
142. See Cruz, 949 S.W.2d at 35.
143. See id. at 36.
144. 960 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1997, writ requested).
145. 873 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
146. See Morua, 960 S.W.2d at 661.
147. See id. at 661-62.
148. 943 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, orig. proceeding).
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cluding Ford from introducing certain evidence at trial, requiring it to pay
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, and requiring it to pay the plaintiffs $10
million as sanctions. 149 As to the first two parts of the order, the court of
appeals concluded that Ford had an adequate remedy on appeal and
therefore refused to grant mandamus relief.150 The appellate court held,
however, that the $10 million sanction was an arbitrary fine that the trial
court had no power to order and that mandamus would lie to correct such
an unauthorized order.151 The court noted that Rule 215(3),152 which sets
forth the available sanctions for abuse of the discovery process, restricts a
trial court to a portion of the "laundry list" of sanctions set forth in Rule
215(2)(b), 153 which does not include monetary fines.' 54 Even if the trial
court's authority were not so limited under the rule, moreover, the court
stated that a monetary fine for discovery abuse is inherently arbitrary
"because it is unrestrained by law or statute and unrelated to any dam-
ages or expenses incurred by the injured party. 1' 55
While exclusion of expert and fact witnesses who have not been timely
identified in response to prior discovery requests is automatic under Rule
215(5),156 Lewis v. Western Waste Industries157 and Lucas v. Titus County
Hospital District,58 stand for the proposition that this automatic exclu-
sion sanction does not extend to the other deficiencies in a party's discov-
ery responses regarding such expert and fact witnesses. In Lewis, the
court reversed the trial judge's exclusion of plaintiff's expert witness
based on the inadequacy of the description of the expert's opinions in
plaintiff's interrogatory answers.1 59 The court held that the defendants'
failure to file a motion to compel, motion for sanctions, or other pretrial
motion addressing this alleged deficiency waived any right to the sanction
of exclusion.' 60 Similarly, the court in Titus held that plaintiffs waived
149. See id. at 531.
150. See id. at 532. The court did note, however, that it had "serious concerns" about
the trial court's award of additional attorneys' fees in the event Ford appealed the sanction
order or sought a writ of mandamus-regardless of whether it was successful in doing so.
See id.
151. See id.
152. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3) (upon finding that party is
abusing discovery process, court "may, after notice and hearing, impose any appropriate
sanction authorized by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) of paragraph 2b of this
rule").
154. See Ford Motor Co., 943 S.W.2d at 533-34.
155. Id. at 534.
156. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
157. 950 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
158. No. 06-96-00069-CV, 1998 WL 18135 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Jan. 21, 1998, no pet.
h.).
159. See Lewis, 950 S.W.2d at 409-10.
160. See id. at 410. Interestingly, the court noted that defendants claimed to have filed
a motion in limine on this point before trial, but the record contained only the motion to
strike made during trial and no motion in limine. See id. Presumably, the court would hold
that a motion in limine filed immediately before trial commences would have been suffi-
cient to avoid the waiver it found in Lewis. If denied, however, a motion in limine will not
preserve error for appeal, and the complaining party will still need to object at trial to the
admission of the expert's testimony.
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any complaint about the defendant's failure to supplement discovery re-
sponses to correct erroneous information. 61 Because plaintiffs' attorney
learned shortly before trial, rather than during trial, that the information
previously provided was incorrect, it was incumbent on plaintiffs to re-
quest a pretrial hearing on the alleged discovery abuse. 162
VIII. DISMISSAL
Noting the distinction between dismissal as a sanction and dismissal for
want of prosecution, the Texas Supreme Court in MacGregor v. Rich163
reversed the decision of the appellate court and affirmed the dismissal by
the trial court of a ten-year old action.1 64 The Court held that the trial
court's ruling dismissing the action based upon several stated grounds
could reasonably be interpreted as either a sanction or a dismissal for
want of prosecution. 165 Because a dismissal for want of prosecution was
not a clear abuse of discretion, the Court declined to review the dismissal
as a death penalty sanction under TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell.166
Similarly, in Shook v. Gilmore & Tatge Manufacturing Co.,167 the court
held that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing
an action for want of prosecution when the plaintiff's counsel failed to
appear at a pretrial conference.' 68 Commenting that the plaintiff's attor-
neys had failed to docket the pretrial hearing on the firm's roster calen-
dar following the departure of one of their attorneys, the court concluded
that the attorney's failure to appear was not an isolated act of negligence,
but the result of conscious indifference because various attorneys and law
clerks at the firm had reviewed the file and even discussed the case with
defense counsel. 169
In Transoceanic Shipping Co. v. General Universal Systems, Inc.,170 the
court granted the appellant's writ of error and held that the trial court
erred in granting a post-answer default judgment. 171 The court noted that
the record contained affirmative proof that the appellant's counsel did
not receive notice of the trial setting because it was mailed to the wrong
address.1 72 In so holding, the court distinguished this situation from
those cases denying writs of error where the record simply does not re-
161. See Titus, 1997 WL 665421, at *2.
162. See id.
163. 941 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1997).
164. See id. at 76.
165. See id. at 75.
166. See id. (discussing TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917-18).
167. 951 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.).
168. See id. at 297-98.
169. See id. at 298.
170. 961 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
171. See id. at 420.
172. See id. The transcript included notices of a trial setting mailed to appellant's coun-
sel that were returned undelivered to the clerk's office. See id.
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flect that the clerk actually sent notice of the trial setting.173
In re Romero174 arose out of a personal injury case, in which the plain-
tiff originally filed suit in county court for damages allegedly sustained in
a car accident. The plaintiff's insurer then intervened to pursue its subro-
gation rights. The plaintiff, having subsequently filed an identical action
in district court, then filed a motion to dismiss the county court action
with prejudice. The order granting the nonsuit, however, failed to men-
tion the intervening insurer. Thirteen months later, the plaintiff and in-
surer sought and obtained an order from the county court modifying the
nonsuit order from a dismissal "with prejudice" to "without prejudice."
The defendant then filed a writ of mandamus, arguing that the modifica-
tion order was void because it was signed after the county court had lost
plenary power. The appellate court concluded, however, that the original
order of nonsuit was interlocutory because it did not expressly or by nec-
essary implication dispose all of the issues and all parties. 175 Thus, the
later order modifying the original order was not void. 176
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court amended Rule 166a 177 during the Survey
period by adding a provision that, effective September 1, 1997, permits
"no evidence" motions. 178 The new subsection provides that, "[a]fter ad-
equate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment
evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no
evidence [as to] one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on
which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.' 179 The
motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence, and the
court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary
judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of fact.' 80 The amended rule
brings Texas in line with the long-standing federal practice of permitting
"no evidence" summary judgment motions.' 8 '
As a result of public comments received following its initial announce-
ment of the amendment, the Court revised its official comments ap-
pended to the change.' 82 Notwithstanding these amended comments,
two justices dissented to the amended rule. 183 Perhaps as a result of this
173. See id. (citing Robert S. Wilson Investment No. 16 Ltd. v. Blumer, 837 S.W.2d 860
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
174. 956 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding).
175. See id. at 662.
176. See id.
177. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a.
178. See Order of April 16, 1997, Misc. Docket No. 97-9067, reprinted in 60 TEX. B.J.
534 (1997).
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
180. See id.
181. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
182. See Order of the Supreme Court, Misc. Docket No. 97-9139, reprinted in 60 TEX.
B.J. 872 (1997).
183. See id. at 873-874.
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dissension, the Court took the unusual step of ordering that its comment,
unlike other notes and comments in the rules, "is intended to inform the
construction and application of the rule. '18 4 Among other things, the
comment specifies that a "discovery period set by pretrial order should be
adequate opportunity for discovery unless there is a showing to the con-
trary," and ordinarily a no-evidence motion would be permitted after this
period but not before.18 5 In addition, the comment provides that a re-
spondent to a motion under Rule 166a(i) need not "marshall its proof; its
response need only point out evidence 186 that raises a fact issue on the
challenged elements." 187
Issues regarding the "finality" of summary judgments continue to
plague Texas courts notwithstanding the decision several years ago in
Mafrige v. Ross.'88 In Mafrige, the Texas Supreme Court held that if a
summary judgment order appears to be final, as evidenced by the inclu-
sion of "Mother Hubbard" language in the order, it should be treated as
final for purposes of appeal. 18 9 If the judgment grants more relief than
requested, it should be reversed and remanded, but the appeal should not
be dismissed.190 In Inglish v. Union State Bank,191 the Texas Supreme
Court reapplied this rule with draconian consequences to the hapless
plaintiff. The defendant in Inglish filed two motions for summary judg-
ment, both of which were granted by the trial court. The first motion
addressed only a few of plaintiff's claims; however, the order granting
that motion stated that defendant was entitled to summary judgment "in
this case" and that the plaintiff should "take nothing on account of his
lawsuit."'1 92 Plaintiff did not appeal this order. Several months later, the
defendant sought summary judgment as to Plaintiff's remaining claims.
At that time, the trial court granted a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc,
which purported to correct the first order to reflect that it was only a
partial summary judgment. It then entered a second order granting sum-
mary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. Following an affirmance of
this second order by the court of appeals, plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court and the defendant moved to dismiss that appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
Agreeing with the defendant, the Court held that the first summary
judgment order was final and appealable under the rule it had announced
184. Id. at 872.
185. Id. at 872-73.
186. Unfortunately, the comment does not illuminate the meaning of "point out evi-
dence," a term which arguably conflicts with the amended rule's language requiring the
respondent to "produce" summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of fact.
Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997).
187. 60 TEX. B.J. at 873.
188. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
189. See id. at 592. Evidence of a court's intention that its judgment be final includes
language that purports to dispose of all claims or parties. See id.
190. See id.
191. 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 811.
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in Mafrige.193 Although the first order did not contain a true "Mother
Hubbard" clause, it clearly purported to be final given the language of
finality it contained. 194 To avoid waiver, therefore, the plaintiff was re-
quired to seek correction of the first order while the trial court retained
plenary power or perfect a timely appeal of that judgment. 195 Having
done neither, the plaintiff failed to invoke appellate jurisdiction and his
appeal was dismissed without consideration of its merits.' 96
In Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Gilchrist,197 the Texas Supreme
Court faced the question of what appellate relief is appropriate when a
plaintiff does properly appeal a summary judgment that purports to be
final but grants more relief than the movant requested. The trial court's
judgment in Bandera contained a Mother Hubbard clause 198 that pro-
fessed to dispose of the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's counter-
claims even though the plaintiff's motion had not addressed the
counterclaims. As a result, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
the entire case to the trial court. 199 The Texas Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the court of appeals should have considered the merits of the
appeal.20° Acknowledging that the courts of appeals have reached differ-
ing results where a final summary judgment was entered when only par-
tial summary judgment was appropriate,20' the Court concluded that the
proper procedure for the court of appeals in these circumstances is to
affirm those portions of the trial court's judgment that are correct and to
reverse and remand only the remainder. 202 By doing so, courts avoid the
needless relitigation of decided issues and thus promote judicial
economy. 203
Two cases decided during the Survey period involved issues of sum-
mary judgment evidence. United Blood Services v. Longoria204 reiterates
that there is no difference between the standards for evidence that would
193. See id.
194. See id. (citing Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)
(concluding that recitation stating plaintiffs shall "have and recover nothing" disposed of
all claims asserted by plaintiffs and made summary judgment final and appealable)).
195. See Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811.
196. See id.
197. 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
198. "A Mother Hubbard clause generally recites that all relief not expressly granted is
denied." Id. at 336 n.1. The Supreme Court expressly noted, however, that language stat-
ing a summary judgment is granted as to all claims or that plaintiff "takes nothing" against
defendant (like that at issue in Inglish) is the functional equivalent of a Mother Hubbard
clause. See id.
199. 924 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996), rev'd, 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997)
(per curiam).
200. See Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d at 336.
201. Compare City of Garland v. Booth, 895 S.W.2d 766, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995,
writ denied) (reversing and remanding only unaddressed claims) and Ross v. Arkwright
Mut. Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 119,134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (same)
with Rose v. Kober Fin. Corp., 874 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ) (reversing and remanding entire case).
202. See Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d at 336.
203. See id. at 337.
204. 938 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1997).
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be admissible in a summary judgment proceeding and those applicable at
a regular trial.20 5 As a result, the Court held in Longoria that the deci-
sion whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony at the sum-
mary judgment stage is a matter committed to the trial court's
discretion. 206 According to Rizkallah v. Conner,20 7 however, an affida-
vit's failure to set forth the expert qualifications of a witness is a defect in
form that is waived if no objection is made.20 8 Mere conclusory state-
ments in an affidavit, on the other hand, are defects in substance that can
be raised for the first time on appeal.20 9 The Rizkallah court appeared
less certain about the issue of whether lack of personal knowledge is a
defect in form or substance, pointing out two decisions by the Texas
Supreme Court that had caused it confusion on this score.210 Faced with
this apparently conflicting authority, the court decided the better rule is
that lack of personal knowledge is a defect in the form of an affidavit that
can be waived by a failure to object.211
X. JURY PRACTICE
The Texas Supreme Court in Goode v. Shoukfeh212 further clarified the
procedural parameters of Edmonson 13 challenges in Texas civil courts.
In Goode, a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff contended that four of
the defendant's peremptory challenges were racially motivated. The de-
fendant's counsel articulated his reasons for striking each of the four ju-
rors. Then the plaintiff's counsel cross examined the defendant's counsel
and sought to introduce into evidence the latter's notes from voir dire.
The trial court sustained a work-product objection to the introduction of
the attorney's notes and refused to examine them in camera. The court of
appeals upheld the trial judge's determination.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the courts below.
In doing so, the Court first held that the proper standard of review of an
Edmonson challenge on appeal is the familiar abuse of discretion stan-
dard.2 14 However, the Court went on to hold that a reviewing court will
not be bound by the trial court's finding of no discrimination "if the justi-
fication offered for striking a potential juror is 'simply too incredible to
be accepted.' '2 15 On the record before it, the Supreme Court concluded
205. See id. at 30.
206. See id.
207. 952 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
208. See id. at 586.
209. See id. at 587.
210. Compare City of Wilmer v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 890 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994), affd, 904 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1995), with Vaughn v. Grand Prairie
I.S.D., 784 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989), rev'd, 792 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1990).
211. See Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 585.
212. 943 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. 1997).
213. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991) (extending the
Court's requirement from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 29 (1986), that a party may not use
its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner in civil suits).
214. See Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446.
215. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991)).
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the defend-
ant's reasons for striking certain jurors.216 The Court then addressed
what, for it, was an issue of first impression: whether the trial court
should have allowed plaintiff's counsel to review, or at least conducted an
in camera inspection itself of, counsel's jury selection notes. The Court
held that, as a general rule, attorneys' notes are non-discoverable work
product under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(a) 217 unless the
privilege is waived or one of the five exceptions enumerated in Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 503(d) 218 is presented. 219 Finding those five ex-
ceptions inapplicable, the Court then addressed the plaintiff's argument
that, by testifying as to the reasons for their peremptory challenges, the
defendant's counsel waived any applicable privilege. The Supreme Court
refused to adopt this analysis, reasoning that such a rule would render an
attorney's work product discoverable as a case progresses through
trial.220 Moreover, the Court held that a trial court is generally not re-
quired to conduct an in camera inspection of counsel's notes in an Ed-
monson challenge since the purpose of such an inspection is to determine
whether a document is privileged, which the attorneys' trial notes clearly
are.221 The Court did hold, however, that the party advancing an Edmon-
son challenge has the right to examine voir dire notes that are actually
relied upon by the opposing attorney while giving sworn or unsworn testi-
mony in response to such a challenge. 222
Finally, noting the absence of clearly defined Edmonson procedures in
Texas jurisprudence, 223 the Court set forth several basic guidelines. First,
the Court required that Edmonson challenges be made in open court.224
Second, unsworn statements of counsel may be offered to explain per-
emptory challenges, and juror information cards may be made part of the
record. 225 Third, to the extent other evidence is to be included in the
record, the rules of civil evidence and procedure apply.226 Finally, the
trial court must permit the challenging party with the opportunity to re-
but race-neutral explanations, including the right to cross examine the
opposing counsel. 227
Construing the requirements of Rule 292,228 two panels of the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals discussed when a juror is considered disabled
from serving. In Sowards v. Yanes, 229 the trial court dismissed an em-
216. See id. at 447-48.
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(a).
218. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503(d).
219. See Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 448.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 448-49.
222. See id. at 449.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 451.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 452.
228. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
229. 955 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. filed).
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paneled juror as disabled who testified that he could not pay attention to
the evidence due to the illness and impending death of his grandfather.
The trial court then overruled the objections of both sides to proceeding
with an eleven-member jury and subsequently overruled the plaintiff's
motion for mistrial following a defense verdict. On appeal, the court re-
versed and remanded the action for a new trial, ruling that while a juror's
own physical or mental disability may permit the trial court to dismiss the
juror and continue the trial, the illness of a family member did not consti-
tute sufficient grounds to render a juror disabled under Rule 292.230
In Fiore v. Fiore,2 31 the court dismissed a juror who, after hearing some
of the evidence, advised that she had developed an extreme prejudice
against one of the litigants because he closely resembled her ex-son-in-
law, who had committed adultery while married to the juror's daughter.
The juror had also developed a skin rash that she attributed to her anxi-
ety. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial holding that
neither the juror's rash nor prejudice rendered her disabled for purposes
of Rule 292.232
In H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Pais,233 the court reversed the decision of
the trial court in vacating a judgment for the defendant based upon the
jury's verdict and in entering a reformed judgment for the plaintiff. In
this slip and fall case, the jury found that the plaintiff was fifty-one per-
cent negligent and the grocery store was forty-nine percent negligent.
The jury ignored the conditioning instructions, however, and also
awarded the plaintiff monetary damages. The plaintiff then submitted
post-verdict affidavits from ten of the eleven jurors who signed the ver-
dict, stating that the percentage of liability assigned to the plaintiff were
mistakenly transposed by the foreperson. However, the plaintiff failed to
obtain an affidavit from the final juror who signed the verdict; and two
other jurors later recanted their affidavit testimony in favor of the plain-
tiff. The appellate court held that under these facts, it was error to grant
the plaintiff any relief from the judgment because clerical mistakes in the
verdict may only be shown by a unanimous jury, which did not exist
here.2 34 Moreover, even if a clerical error had been properly proven, the
only remedy available to the trial court is to grant a new trial, not to enter
a different judgment.235
In Guerra v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,236 the court held that a juror's mem-
bership in Sam's Club, an entity related to Wal-Mart, was too remote to
constitute a direct or indirect interest in the subject matter of the litiga-
tion justifying disqualification.
230. See id. at 459.
231. 946 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
232. See id. at 438.
233. 955 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).
234. See id. at 387.
235. See id. at 388.
236. 943 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
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Finally, in its Letter Opinion No. 97-009,237 the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral opined that it was improper for a petit juror to receive reimburse-
ment in excess of the statutorily2 38 mandated range in a given case, even
where the litigants agreed to pay the difference between the statutory
maximum and the additional amounts proposed to be paid to the ju-
rors. 239 All jurors who serve during a given year are entitled to receive
the same amount, which was not to exceed thirty dollars (now fifty dol-
lars) per day.2 40
XI. JURY CHARGE
In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.,241 an accounting
malpractice case, the Texas Supreme Court held that in a Deceptive
Trade Practices Act 2 42 case, a plaintiff may not submit the question of
"reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees" to the jury in a form that asks
for an answer to be expressed as a percentage of recovery.2 43 Instead, the
Court announced that in determining what fees are reasonable, a fact
finder must consider more than a party's contingency fee agreement, in-
cluding such factors as: (1) the time and labor required, including the
novelty and difficulty of the issues and the skill required to perform the
legal service properly; (2) the likelihood that the case will preclude other
employment by the attorney; (3) the fee customarily charged in the local-
ity for similar legal services; (4) the amount of money involved and the
results obtained; (5) time limitations imposed by the client or circum-
stances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and (8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 244 Although the decision in Arthur
Anderson expressly addresses only Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims,
the Supreme Court's reasoning appears to leave little room for an argu-
ment that attorneys' fees under other fee-shifting statutes can still be sub-
mitted to the jury in the form of a percentage of the judgment.
XII. JUDGMENTS
In a trilogy of cases decided on the same day, the Texas Supreme Court
set forth the guidelines under which a request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law properly extends the deadline for perfecting an appeal.
In IKB Industries v. Pro-Line Corp.,245 Phillips v. Beavers,2 46 and Awde v.
237. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. LO 97-009 (1997).
238. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 61.001(a) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1998).
239. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. LO 97-009 (1997).
240. See id. (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 61.001(a)).
241. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
242. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
243. See Arthur Anderson, 945 S.W.2d at 819.
244. See id. at 818 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.04, reprinted in
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1998) (TEX. STATE BAR R.
art. X, § 9)).
245. 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997).
246. 938 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1997).
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Dabeit247 the Court held that "[a] request for findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law does not extend the time for perfecting an appeal of a judg-
ment rendered as a matter of law, where findings and conclusions can
have no purpose and should not be requested, made, or considered on
appeal, ' 2 48 As examples of such situations, the Court cited summary
judgments, judgments following a directed verdict, judgment non-ob-
stante verdicto, default judgments awarding liquidated damages, dismis-
sals for want of prosecution or jurisdiction entered absent an evidentiary
hearing, dismissals based upon the pleadings or special exceptions, and
any judgments entered without an evidentiary hearing. By contrast, the
Court ruled that a timely filed request for findings of fact and conclusions
of law will extend the deadline for perfecting an appeal when they are
required by Rule 296,249 or are not so required, but "are not without pur-
pose."250 As examples of such instances, the Court listed judgments en-
tered after a conventional bench trial, default judgments entered on a
claim for unliquidated damages, judgments rendered as sanctions, and
any judgments based in any part on any evidentiary hearing.
In applying these guidelines, the Texas Supreme Court in Phillips v.
Beavers251 held that a timely filed request for findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law also extended the deadline for filing an appellate record
under Rule 54(a) 252 "when findings and conclusions are required by Rule
296, or when they are not required by Rule 296 but are not without pur-
pose-that is, they could be properly considered by the appellate
court. "253
In Board of Trustees of Bastrop Independent School District v. Toun-
gate,254 involving the application of hair-length regulations to male stu-
dents, the Texas Supreme Court discussed the signing of a modified
judgment and its impact on appellate timetables. The trial court in this
case originally entered a judgment in favor of the school district, but later
modified its judgment finding that the application of these regulations
violated state constitutional and statutory laws. While the district court
modified the original judgment within its plenary power, it failed to notify
the parties of its modified judgment for another thirty-one days, and did
not file the modified judgment until thirty-eight days after it had been
signed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the signing (rather than the
filing) of the modified judgment controlled whether the trial court timely
modified the original judgment within its plenary power, and that Rule
247. 938 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1997).
248. IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 443.
249. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
250. IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 443.
251. 938 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1997).
252. TEX. R. App. P. 54(a).
253. 938 S.W.2d at 447. See also City of Lancaster v. Texas Nat. Resource Conserv.
Comm'n., 935 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (Where the record shows
that the trial court's judgment is not based upon evidence heard by the trial court, a re-
quest for findings of fact will not extend appellate timetables).
254. 958 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. 1997).
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306a(4) 255 protects the appellant's rights because the parties did not re-
ceive timely notice of the judgment.2 56 Thus, the Court held that the ap-
pellant's timetable did not run until it was notified of the modified
judgment, and further advised that the trial court should have submitted
the modified judgment to the clerk immediately upon signing to avoid the
need for a notification hearing under Rule 306a(3) and (4).257
Several courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, considered the sub-
jects of compulsory counterclaims, res judicata, and collateral estoppel
during the Survey period. In Klein v. Dooley,2 58 the Court held that
while a plaintiff's nonsuit of a DTPA259 claim did not adversely affect the
defendant's DTPA counterclaim, 260 the trial of the DTPA counterclaim
on its merits did bar the plaintiff from later refilling suit against the same
defendant based upon the same underlying facts because the plaintiff's
nonsuit rights were absolute and its claims were not compulsory counter-
claims under Rule 97261 to a DTPA claim for attorneys' fees.
The plaintiff in Rexrode v. Bazar262 did not fare as well as the plaintiff
in Klein. In Rexrode, a personal injury action resulting from a car acci-
dent, the plaintiff sued another driver and the plaintiff's own insurer, but
later nonsuited the individual defendant during trial. After the insurer
nonsuited its cross claim, it successfully moved for an instructed verdict.
The plaintiff then filed a second suit against the driver, who successfully
moved for summary judgment under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that because the plaintiff elected to
proceed to verdict against the insurer, and as the instructed verdict in
favor of the insurer necessarily involved litigation on the merits of the
plaintiff's underlying claims against the individual defendant, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff's second suit.263
In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp.,264 a complex action in-
volving a construction contract and an indemnity clause that provided for
the recovery of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, the defendants ob-
tained an interlocutory summary judgment that the plaintiff's claims
against it were barred by the indemnity provision. The trial court severed
this portion of the action and abated the balance of the case pending an
appeal on the indemnity issues. After the abatement was lifted, the de-
fendants moved for summary judgment on their claim for attorneys' fees.
The plaintiff filed its cross-motion for summary judgment, contending
that the attorneys' fees claims were compulsory counterclaims that had
been waived and were now time barred. The appellate court affirmed,
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
256. See Toungate, 958 S.W.2d at 366.
257. See id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3), (4)).
258. 949 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1997).
259. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987).
260. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97.
262. 937 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ).
263. See id. at 617.
264. 953 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref'd).
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holding that the parties seeking to recover their attorneys' fees had not
timely done so, and could not properly wait until the underlying liability
claim under the indemnity provision had been adjudicated. 265
In Goldman v. White Rose Distributing Co.,266 the court balanced the
doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel arising in the context of two
actions involving a shareholder dispute. In the first action, Goldman, the
corporation's former president, sued the corporation and its shareholders
for their failure to pay his annual bonus and the share of the proceeds
from the sole of the corporation's assets. The defendants counterclaimed
against Goldman for misuse of funds. During the first trial, the defend-
ants and their counsel repeatedly admitted that Goldman was owed cer-
tain funds that had been placed in escrow, and advised the jury not to
consider those funds owed to Goldman as part of their deliberations. The
jury found against Goldman and in favor of the defendants, which deci-
sion the appellate court affirmed, including the portion of the judgment
denying recovery to Goldman. Goldman later demanded payments of
amounts owed to him, offset by the amount of the judgment, and subse-
quently filed suit to recover those monies. The corporation successfully
moved for summary judgment against Goldman under the theory of res
judicata. On appeal, the court reversed holding that while all of the ele-
ments of res judicata were present regarding Goldman's claims, the cor-
poration was still judicially estopped from claiming res judicata, because
such a position in the second action was inconsistent with the corpora-
tion's position in the first case, such that it could not tell the court and
jury in the first case that Goldman was entitled to recover funds and later
rely upon res judicata as a defense to Goldman's claims for those
monies. 267
Two courts opined on the relationship between judgments and agree-
ments under Rule 11,268 reached in the context of the divorce proceed-
ings. In Spinks v. Spinks,2 69 the trial court entered a final divorce decree
based upon an agreement reached during a court-ordered mediation.
The appellate court reversed, holding that one party had subsequently
withdrawn its consent to agreement, which was not binding in any event
because the non-revocation clause in the agreement was not underlined
as mandated by section 153.0071(d) of the Family Code.270
In Keim v. Anderson,2 71 the appellate court reversed a judgment en-
tered in a divorce decree where the trial court had originally awarded
attorneys' fees in a sanctions hearing, but later entered an oral final judg-
265. See id. at 819.
266. 936 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996), judgment vacated by, 949 S.W.2d
707 (Tex. 1997).
267. See Goldman, 949 S.W.2d at 710.
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
269. 939 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
270. See id. at 234 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(d) (Vernon 1996)).
271. 943 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ).
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ment based on a Rule 11272 stipulation, following a substitution of coun-
sel, which judgment did not mention the prior award of attorneys' fees.
The original attorney intervened to recover his fees, following which the
trial court entered a final written decree that included an award of fees to
the intervening attorney, to which the parties had not agreed in their stip-
ulation. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded holding that the
trial court's oral rendition of judgment constituted a final judgment dis-
posing of all issues and parties.273 However, because the trial court's sub-
sequent ruling contained provisions that varied from the parties' Rule 11
agreement, the court below acted improperly and either had to: (1) ac-
cept the agreement as stipulated; (2) set aside the agreement to consider
the intervention; or (3) reject the agreement as failing to constitute a just
and right division of the parties' estates.
274
In Biotrace International, Inc. v. Wilwerding275 the appellate court re-
versed a default judgment rendered against the defendants where the
plaintiff's latest petition failed to contain jurisdictional allegations suffi-
cient to meet due process requirements. Specifically, while the plaintiff's
petition stated that telephone conversations occurred between the par-
ties, the petition did not show that these conversations took place while
the plaintiff was in Texas, and that such pleadings were insufficient to
confer in personam jurisdiction over the defendants. Therefore, an error
existed on the face of the record.
In Caruso v. Shropshire,276 the court held that an abstract of judgment
of a judgmental lien listed under only one plaintiff and none of the re-
maining fifty-three judgment plaintiffs failed substantially to comply with
the requirements of section 52.003 of the Texas Property Code by failing
to list all of the judgment plaintiffs. Therefore, no valid judgment lien
existed to be enforced.
Finally, in State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Williams,277 involving a coverage
dispute under a homeowner's insurance policy, the appellate court re-
versed and remanded a judgment where the trial court improperly as-
sessed damages as a matter of law. In Williams, the appellees sued the
estates of the homeowners seeking compensation for injuries they sus-
tained as a result of certain shootings. The insurer defended those actions
under a homeowner's policy it had issued, that resulted in a judgment
against the estates for $4.25 million, which the insurers refused to pay as
to one of the homeowners. Thereafter, the appellees, assignees of the
estates, filed suit against the insurer regarding the coverage issues. Fol-
lowing a trial on the merits, the trial judge entered a judgment as a matter
of law for $4.25 million in actual damages, representing the amount of the
272. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
273. See Keim, 943 S.W.2d at 942.
274. See id.
275. 937 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
276. 954 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).




judgment against the insureds in the original action. Because the trial
court concluded that the appellees were entitled to a submission of liabil-
ity issues, the trial court erred in then refusing to put a damage question
to the jury based on these theories of liability.278 The court distinguished
this case from other Stowers type cases where the amount can be readily
determined where a simple mathematical calculation provides the differ-
ence between the policy limits and the amount of the underlying judg-
ment.279 Here, the face of the judgment did not allow the trial court to
determine the amount of the underlying judgment against the insured.
Therefore, the trial court should have submitted a damage question to the
jury.
XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Two cases during the Survey period addressed the issue of timely-filed
motions for new trial and untimely-paid filing fees. In Tate v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co.,280 the appellant timely filed a motion for new trial,
but did not pay the required fifteen dollar filing fee. The clerk treated the
motion as "received" but not "filed" and did not forward the motion to
the court for a ruling. After the motion was deemed overruled by opera-
tion of law, but before the trial court lost its plenary jurisdiction, the ap-
pellant perfected an appeal and tendered the filing fee. In reversing the
court of appeals' dismissal of the appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held
that, while the failure to pay the filing fee for a motion for new trial
before it is overruled by operation of law forfeits the movant's opportu-
nity to have the trial court consider the motion, it does not retroactively
invalidate the conditional filing for purposes of the appellate timetable. 281
In a footnote, however, the Texas Supreme Court expressly declined to
address the questions of: (1) whether a motion for new trial extends the
appellate timetable if the filing fee is not paid within the period of the
trial court's plenary jurisdiction; and (2) whether a motion for new trial,
while extending the appellate timetable, properly preserves error for ap-
peal where the filing fee is paid after a motion for new trial is overruled
by operation of law. 282
In Polley v. Odom,2 83 the court addressed and answered the first of the
two questions left open by the Supreme Court in Tate. Specifically, the
Polley court held that where a party files a motion for new trial but does
not pay the filing fee until after the trial court loses its plenary jurisdic-
278. See id. at *4.
279. See id.
280. 934 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1996).
281. See id. at 84. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals had relied upon dicta in
Arndt v. Arndt, 709 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (a
motion for new trial "will not act to extend the appellate timetables if the required $15 fee
is not paid before the motion is heard or before it is overruled"). See Tate, 934 S.W.2d at
84. Presumably, this language in Arndt has been overruled by the holding in Tate.
282. See id. at n.1.
283. 937 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
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tion, the appellate timetables were extended "regardless of when the fil-
ing fee is paid. '284
XIV. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
A divided Texas Supreme Court approved a trial court's conduct of an
ex parte, in camera hearing under the circumstances presented in United
States v. Marks.2 85 The case arose out of an action filed by Marks to
perpetuate the testimony of his accountant. 286 The Office of Independ-
ent Counsel of the United States Government intervened in the proceed-
ing and objected to the requested deposition on the ground that it would
interfere with a pending grand jury investigation in which Marks was a
target and his accountant a witness.287 The attorney for the government
offered to tell the trial court enough about the grand jury investigation
only if she could do so without Marks' counsel present, stating that she
could not reveal the information to anyone other than the court because
of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 288 Over Mark's
objection, the trial court agreed to this request and, following the conclu-
sion of the hearing, ordered the accountant's deposition delayed and the
court reporter's record of the in camera proceeding sealed.289
In a strongly-worded opinion, 290 the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's sealing order. 291 In addition to condemning the secret
nature of the procedure, the appellate court had held that the trial court
did not follow the requirements of Rule 76a 292 in entering the sealing
order.293 The Supreme Court modified and reinstated the trial court's
order, however, holding that an ex parte, in camera proceeding may be
justified in "extraordinary circumstances" and was appropriate in the case
before it.294 Although the Court acknowledged that the procedures for
sealing of "court records" were not followed, it noted that Rule
76a(2)(a)(2) 95 excepts from the definition of court records "documents
in court files to which access is otherwise restricted by law."'2 96 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that, "[t]o the extent the sealed record contained
information protected by Rule 6(e), it is not a 'court record' under Rule
76a(2)(a)(2), and thus sealing of those portions of the record does not
284. Id. at 626.
285. 949 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1997).
286. See id. at 322.
287. See id. at 322-23.
288. See id. at 323 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)).
289. See id.
290. See Marks v. Feldman, 910 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995) (likening the
trial court's procedure to the British Star Chamber), rev'd, 949 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1997).
291. See id.
292. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
293. See Marks, 910 S.W.2d at 78 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3) (requiring written mo-
tion and public notice)).
294. Marks, 949 S.W.2d at 322.
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(a)(2).
296. Marks, 949 S.W.2d at 324 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(a)(2)).
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violate Rule 76a. ''297 The Court also rejected Marks' argument that the
ex parte proceeding and sealing of the record violated his due process
rights under the Federal and State Constitutions.298 Ex parte proceed-
ings, while looked on with "extreme disfavor" are necessary in certain
circumstances, and the Court concluded that hearing oral statements in
camera is not so unlike reviewing written materials as to violate due
process.299
XV. DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES
Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code300 permits a litigant to
disqualify an assigned or visiting judge if he objects before the first hear-
ing or trial over which the assigned judge is to preside.301 Numerous de-
cisions have held that an objection under section 74.053 is too late if it
comes after the assigned judge makes any ruling in the case, even on a
motion for continuance. 30 2 Three cases decided during the Survey period
draw into question this broad statement of the rule.
In Bourgeois v. Collier,30 3 for example, the court of appeals permitted a
litigant to disqualify a judge assigned to the trial on the merits after that
judge had earlier presided at a contempt proceeding without objection.
The visiting judge presided at the contempt proceeding pursuant to a gen-
eral assignment to the court for a period of one week. This general as-
signment also expressly authorized the visiting judge to sit longer if
necessary to complete any trials commenced during the week or to rule
on other matters growing out of cases tried during the week. More than a
month later, after the general assignment had expired, the same visiting
judge was specially reassigned to hear the trial of the case when the regu-
lar trial judge recused himself due to health reasons. In his order overrul-
ing the litigant's objection to the special assignment, the visiting judge
characterized the special assignment as "superfluous" because the earlier
general assignment vested him with authority to preside over all matters
in controversy in the case. The court of appeals decided, however, that
the special assignment evidenced the presiding administrative judge's
view that the contempt proceeding was separate and independent from
the trial of the underlying case.304 The appellate court shared that view,
holding that because a contempt proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature it
is not necessarily a pretrial hearing that authorizes a visiting judge to hear
297. Id. The Court did hold that certain parts of the sealed record clearly did not fall
within the scope of grand jury secrecy and ordered those portions unsealed. Id. at 323-24.
298. See id. at 325-26.
299. Id.
300. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
301. See id.
302. See, e.g., Morris v. Short, 902 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ denied); Money v. Jones, 766 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ
denied).
303. 959 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1997, no writ).
304. See id. at *3.
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all related proceedings under a general assignment. 30 5 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the visiting judge had no authority, except by the
special assignment, to preside over the trial on the merits.30 6 Because the
litigant objected to the visiting judge before he presided over any hearing
pursuant to the special assignment, the objection was timely and disquali-
fication was mandatory.30 7
The court of appeals in O'Connor v. Lykos 30 8 also ordered disqualifica-
tion of a visiting judge who had been assigned to the retrial of a case after
earlier presiding without objection at the hearing on a motion for new
trial. Once again, the decision was predicated on the existence of two
separate assignment orders. According to the appellate court, the visiting
judge's authority under the first general assignment terminated when she
signed the order granting a new trial.30 9 At that point, any authority the
visiting judge had to conduct the retrial would have had to be based on
the second assignment order, to which a timely objection was made. 310
DiFerrante v. Smith31' likewise holds that an objection to a subsequent
assignment of the same visiting judge is timely if made before the judge
presides at any hearing pursuant to the second assignment order. The
visiting judge in DiFerrante first presided at a recusal hearing pursuant to
assignment. Later, he was separately assigned to preside over the lawsuit
generally. According to the court of appeals, the parties could not have
had a right under section 74.053 to object to the subsequent assignment
until that assignment was made, which did not occur until after the earlier
recusal matter was concluded.312
Although section 74.053 of the Government Code generally allows a
party to make only one objection to any assigned judge, 313 objections to
"a former judge or justice who was not a retired judge" are unlimited in
number.314 Because former judges who had not yet qualified for retiree
status when they resigned from the bench or were defeated for reelection
are still members of the Judicial Retirement System, they can accumulate
retirement credit by continuing to serve as assigned, visiting judges.315
Thus, a former judge, although not vested when the judge leaves elective
305. See id.
306. See id. at *4.
307. See id. (citing Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
orig. proceeding)).
308. 960 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, orig. proceeding).
309. See id. at *2. The court noted, however, that its analysis in this regard was based
on an interpretation of the language of the assignment order itself rather than some under-
lying statute or principle of common law. See id. at *2 n.3.
310. See id. at *2. The court also held that there is no statutory requirement that the
objection be verified and that verification is unnecessary because, unlike a rule 18a motion
to disqualify or recuse, a party need not assert any facts in an objection to an assigned
judge. Id. at *2. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
311. 940 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, orig. proceeding).
312. See id. at 849.
313. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
314. Id. § 74.053(d).
315. See TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. §§ 831.001(3), 832.001(a) and (d), 833.101, 836.001(5),
837.001(a) and (d), 838.101 (Vernon 1994).
1998] 1411
SMU LAW REVIEW
office, may accumulate enough service credits to receive an annuity and,
if other requirements are met, may become a retired judge.316 The ques-
tion presented in Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth317 was whether as-
signed judges in these circumstances constituted "former judges" or
"retired judges" for purposes of determining the number of objections a
party can make under section 74.053. After analyzing both the language
and history of the statute in an effort to divine the Legislature's intent,318
the Supreme Court held that the status of a judge as a "former judge ...
who was not a retired judge" is fixed when a judge leaves office. 319 The
litigant's objection to the assigned judge in Mitchell was therefore valid
and disqualification was mandatory, even though the litigant had already
exercised an objection under section 74.053(b) to an earlier assigned
judge, because the former judge subsequently assigned to the case did not
qualify for "senior judge" status until after she left office. 320
XVI. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
News America Publishing, Inc. v. Priest321 involved the anti-contact
rule, 322 which prohibits communications by opposing counsel with a per-
son known to be represented by counsel. The plaintiff in Priest sued for
breach of contract and tortious interference naming as defendants a pub-
lishing corporation and several of its former officers. All of the defend-
ants were represented by counsel. During the course of the suit, one of
the individual defendants sent a letter to plaintiff and his counsel advising
them that he had terminated his counsel, that he was no longer repre-
sented in the matter, and that he wished to meet without his "former"
counsel present to discuss the lawsuit. No notice of this communication
or the meeting subsequently held between the individual defendant, the
plaintiff, and plaintiff's attorneys was given to the individual defendant's
"former" counsel or counsel for the co-defendants. Following the meet-
ing, plaintiff non-suited the individual defendant. Months later, after the
other defendants had learned of the meeting and the plaintiff had desig-
nated the non-suited defendant as one of his expert witnesses, defendants
filed a motion seeking to disqualify plaintiff's lawyers for violations of
316. See id. § 75.001; Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex.
1997).
317. 943 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. 1997).
318. See id. at 438-40.
319. Id. at 437.
320. Id.
321. No. 04-96-00810-CV, 1997 WL 268540 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 21, 1997,
orig. proceeding), opinion withdrawn and superseded by 1998 WL 105451 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Mar. 11, no pet. h.).
322. Disciplinary Rule 4.02(a) states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not com-
municate or cause or encourage another to communicate about the subject of the represen-
tation with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CON-
DUCT 4.02(a), reprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp.
1998) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art X, § 9).
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Rule 4.02. While acknowledging that common courtesy required a phone
call between lawyers before the meeting was held,32 3 the trial court de-
nied the motion to disqualify presumably on the basis that the non-suited
defendant was no longer represented by counsel at the time of the
meeting.
In what appears to be a case of first impression in Texas,324 the appel-
late court in Priest decided that disqualification of plaintiff's counsel was
mandatory under the circumstances and granted mandamus relief.32 5 In
doing so, the court conceded that any person may terminate his counsel
and, when this occurs, opposing counsel is free to communicate with the
now-unrepresented person within the guidelines of Rule 4.03. 326 The is-
sue for the court, however, was whether the client's unilateral statement
to opposing counsel that he had terminated his lawyer and wished to en-
gage in discussions outside that lawyer's presence was sufficient to termi-
nate the attorney-client relationship before he had conveyed that decision
to his lawyer. 327 The court decided it was not for two reasons. First, after
reviewing various bar opinions suggesting that Rule 4.02(a)'s protections
may not be waived by the client, 328 the court decided that the plaintiff's
counsel had an ethical responsibility to do more to ascertain the represen-
tational status of opposing counsel in the ongoing litigation rather than to
rely on the unilateral statements of the former defendant. 329 Second, the
court decided that Texas's procedural rules regarding designation of lead
counsel 330 and substitution of counsel331 prevented plaintiff's attorney
from communicating with the former defendant until his attorney had
formally withdrawn from the representation. 332 Finally, in granting the
requested mandamus relief, the court observed that the anti-contact rule
is more than common courtesy; it is a professional requirement imposed
to protect the client, other parties, and the very integrity of the adversary
system.333
Rule 1.06334 provides that a lawyer shall not represent opposing parties
to the same litigation. Based on this rule, a law firm that appeared as
323. See Priest, 1997 WL 268540 at *5.
324. See id. at *1.
325. See id. at *6.
326. See id. at *4. Disciplinary Rule 4.03, entitled "Dealing With Unrepresented Per-
son," sets guidelines for communications between counsel and persons who are not repre-
sented by counsel. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.03.
327. See Priest, 1997 WL 268540 at *1.
328. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-
396 (1995) (anti-contact rule does not contemplate client's waiver of its protection); Id.,
Formal Op. 108 (1934) (same).
329. See Priest, 1997 WL 268540 at *4.
330. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 8 (attorney whose signature first appears on initial pleadings
shall be attorney in charge; until designation changed in writing, said attorney shall be
responsible for suit and all communications from other counsel with respect to suit shall be
sent to him).
331. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 10.
332. See Priest, 1997 WL 268540 at *5.
333. See id. at *6.
334. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06(a).
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local counsel for the defendant in Smirl v. BridewelP35 immediately with-
drew from that representation after being reminded by plaintiff's counsel
that it had earlier been contacted by the plaintiff about serving as his local
counsel. Attempting to expand the rule's coverage, the plaintiff also
sought to remove the defendant's lead law firm in the case on the basis
that it too was disqualified under subsection (f) of the rule, which ad-
dresses lawyers who are members of or associated with the disqualified
lawyer's firm.336 The Smirl court disagreed, holding that the local counsel
was not a "member" of or "associated with" the defendant's lead law firm
under the plain language of the rule.337 Given the context of the rule, the
court concluded that "member" means a partner or shareholder of the
firm and "associated with" refers to an associate, who is a lawyer on the
firm's payroll as an employee.338
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. SANCTIONS
The court in Wallace v. Investment Advisors, Inc.339 affirmed Rule 13340
sanctions against an attorney for filing a lawsuit solely as a means to ob-
tain the deposition of a third-party witness for use in an arbitration pro-
ceeding.341 The plaintiff in that case had initiated the arbitration
proceeding, but was unable under the applicable arbitration rules to com-
pel the witness's deposition. 342 Plaintiff and defendants then entered into
an agreement whereby defendants would agree to submit to the arbitra-
tion in exchange for plaintiff's agreement to file a state-court lawsuit, ob-
tain the deposition of the third party, and then dismiss the lawsuit. 343 The
trial court found, and the appellate court agreed, that the resulting law-
suit was fraudulently filed, and the plaintiff's attorney subject to sanc-
tions, because it was never intended that the controversy would actually
be decided by the court. 344
Rule 13345 permits sanctions to be imposed only for "good cause, the
particulars of which must be stated in the sanctions order. '346 The issue
335. 932 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
336. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06(f) provides: "If a lawyer would
be prohibited by this Rule from engaging in particular conduct, no other lawyer while a
member or associated with that lawyer's firm may engage in that conduct."
337. Smirl, 932 S.W.2d at 745.
338. Id. at 744 (citing Samuels v. Montgomery, 793 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied])).
339. 960 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet. h.).
340. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
341. See Wallace, 960 S.W.2d at 890.
342. See id. at 887.
343. See id. at 887-88.
344. See id. at 888. The dissent in Wallace argued that the majority was, in effect, im-
properly punishing the attorney for violating the "spirit," rather than any express provi-
sion, of the rules. Id. at 890 (Cornelius, C.J., dissenting).




in Land v. AT&S Transportation, Inc. 347 was whether, in order to pre-
serve error for appeal, a party must object to a lack of particularity in a
sanctions order.348 Noting that its sister courts of appeal were split on
this issue, 349 the court in Land held that the complaining party must ob-
ject in the trial court to the lack of particularity. 350
B. ARBITRATION
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the statutory standard for vacat-
ing an arbitration award based on "evident partiality by an arbitrator ap-
pointed as a neutral" 351 in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. TUCO,
Inc.352 Following an extensive survey of the federal and state authorities
on the issue,353 the Court held "that a prospective neutral arbitrator se-
lected by the parties or their representatives exhibits evident partiality if
he or she does not disclose facts which might, to an objective observer,
create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator's partiality. ' 354 Impor-
tantly, the question is not whether the nondisclosed facts actually estab-
lish bias; the nondisclosure itself satisfies the statutory standard of
evident partiality.355 Applying this standard to the case before it, the
Court held that the failure of a neutral arbitrator in a three-arbitrator
panel to disclose that one of the party arbitrators had recently referred a
major piece of litigation to him constituted evident partiality.35 6
The Texas Supreme Court emphasized the heavy burden on a party
claiming that there has been a waiver of a right to arbitration in EZ Pawn
Corp. v. Mancias.357 Deciding the case under the Federal Arbitration
Act,358 the Court held that a delay of almost one year in requesting arbi-
tration, where there had been little activity in the case and the opposing
party did not otherwise demonstrate prejudice from the delay, did not
establish a waiver.359 In Bruce Terminix Co. v. Carroll,360 on the other
hand, the court held that a party's failure to proceed with a court-ordered
arbitration for almost three years constitutes a waiver of its right to
arbitrate. 361
347. 947 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.).
348. See id. at 666.
349. See id. at 666-67.
350. See id. at 667. The court also rejected the appellant's challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence because he failed to provide a complete record from the trial, which the
statement of facts from the sanctions hearing indicated the trial court had considered in
imposing sanctions. See id. at 668.
351. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.014 (Vernon 1997).
352. 960 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1997).
353. See id. at 704-06.
354. Id. at 707.
355. See id. This duty of disclosure applies only a neutral arbitrator and not party arbi-
trators who are not intended to be neutral. See id. at 707-08.
356. See id. at 708.
357. 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1996).
358. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
359. See EZ Pawn, 934 S.W.2d at 89-90.
360. 953 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, orig. proceeding).
361. See id. at 540.
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C. ADR AND RULE 11 AGREEMENTS
In Banda v. Garcia,362 the Texas Supreme Court held that an attorney's
unsworn statements that a settlement had been entered into prior to the
filing of suit constituted some evidence sufficient to allow the trial court
to enforce the settlement.363 The Court reasoned that while an attorney's
statements must normally be under oath to be considered as evidence,
the opposing party failed to object even though he was on notice that the
attorney was trying to prove the existence and terms of the oral agree-
ment.364 Curiously, the Court did not discuss at all its own precedent,
recently reaffirmed in Padilla v. LaFrance,365 that a settlement agreement
must comply with Rule 11366 in order to be enforceable. 367 It is impossi-
ble to tell from the opinion if this omission is the result of the failure of
the parties to raise the issue or an unstated premise that the oral agree-
ment at issue was not one "touching" on the suit pending within the
meaning of Rule 11368 since it was entered into prior to the filing of suit.
Tindall v. Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C.,3 6 9 on the other hand,
squarely addressed the issue of the enforceability of a settlement agree-
ment under Rule 11.370 The parties in that case had dictated their agree-
ment to the court reporter at a deposition. 371 When the defendant failed
to perform under the agreement, the plaintiff successfully moved for sum-
mary judgment. 372 The court of appeals agreed with the defendant that
an agreement announced to, and transcribed by, a deposition officer does
not meet the writing and signature requirements of Rule 11. 373 The court
went on to hold, however, that the oral agreement was nevertheless en-
forceable as an exception to the statute of frauds374 and, therefore, af-
firmed the summary judgment in plaintiff's favor.375 This latter
conclusion is difficult to square with the Supreme Court authority, dis-
cussed above, that a settlement agreement must comply with Rule 11376
to be enforceable. 377
The court in Nueces County v. De Pena378 provided useful guidance for
practitioners representing governmental bodies. Responding to an order
362. 955 S.W.2d 270 (1997).
363. See id. at 272.
364. See id.
365. 907 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1995).
366. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
367. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460.
368. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
369. 961 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
370. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
371. See Tindall, 961 S.W.2d at 249.
372. See id. at 250.
373. See id. at 251. Nor does such a procedure constitute an agreement made in open
court and entered of record. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
374. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987) (agreements per-
formable within a year).
375. See Tindall, 961 S.W.2d at 252.
376. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
377. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460.
378. 953 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding).
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referring the case to mediation, the Nueces County Commissioners'
Court authorized the county attorney to represent it at the mediation and
to settle the case within a specified range.379 On the opposing party's
motion, however, the trial court ordered the county judge to personally
attend the mediation conference.380 Noting that a county can only act
through its commissioners' court, and that even the county judge did not,
therefore, have the individual authority to settle the case, the court of
appeals held that the trial judge abused his discretion in requiring the
county judge to attend the mediation. 381
379. See id. at 836.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 836-37.
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